Our review is only concerned with western welfare states. Apart from analyzing belligerent countries (aggressors and attacked countries) it is also necessary to shed light on countries which were not directly involved in military hostilities iv and it is very likely that both the impact of large-scale military conflict on social policy and the underlying causal mechanisms differ between these countries. T.H. Marshall stated in 1965 that "the experience of total war is […] bound to have an effect on both the principles of social policy and the methods of social administration. But the nature of this effect will depend to a considerable extent on the fortunes of war -on whether a country is invaded or not, on whether it is victorious or defeated, and on the amount of physical destruction and social disorganization it suffers". 12 It is therefore reasonable to assume that the mechanisms discussed in the following have different effects for aggressors than for attacked or neutral countries with more or less defensive strategies. Superpowers and imperial countries will possibly be quite different in many respects compared to small states. Moreover, democracies and authoritarian states may display different political logics.
In terms of effects, our review suggests that war is an important variable for explaining crossnational differences in welfare state development that needs to be systematically addressed by comparative research. More specifically, mass warfare -and often in an unintended mannerhas paved the way for more public intervention in social affairs and crowded-out markets from social provision. In addition, mass war has influenced program adoption and has boosted social spending in the post-war era. Yet, war is not the only or even the most important single factor explaining the development of welfare states. The usual suspects in the comparative welfare state literature such as political parties and interest organizations, economic growth, political institutions, and ideas, are all very important explanatory factors. However, it is well documented that war also had a significant impact on all these determinants. 12 Marshall 1965, 82.
The paper is organized as follows. The next three sections provide an overview of possible causal mechanisms linking war and the welfare state. Relying on evidence from the existing literature each of these sections is divided into sub-sections devoted to a particular precipitating factor. Section 5 is concerned with the effects resulting from of industrialized warfare on advanced welfare states, while the final section concludes and discusses promising avenues of future research.
The Phase of War Preparation
Between the Congress of Berlin in 1878 and the outbreak of the Great War in 1914 Europe escaped large-scaled military conflicts between the great powers. 13 In retrospect, however, war was the rule in Europe and given this experience a future war remained a likely scenario. In fact, the rivalries between the great powers steadily increased over these decades and imperialist attitudes fuelled massive war preparation efforts everywhere. A key player in terms of war preparation was the military. The longer the previous war receded into history, the greater was the uncertainty among the army commands about the nature of the future war. The major reason for this uncertainty was the rapid progress in military technology from the 1870s onwards which has dramatically increased the fire power of weapons and fundamentally changed the nature and conduct of war. The precise consequences of industrialized warfare, however, were widely unknown. 14 The only thing taken for granted was that an upcoming violent conflict would be waged as a mass war. The two world wars confirmed the truth of this image of a total war and demonstrated its unprecedented destructive consequences, and the inter-war period can be considered for some countries as one long phase of war preparation.
The emergence of mass war is closely related to the spread of the mass conscript army during the second half of the 19th century. The emergence of universal conscription in continental Europe 13 Chickering et al. 2012 . 14 Krumreich 2012. was mainly the result of military setbacks and military competition. 15 Prussia was the first country that emulated the French people's army by introducing universal male conscription in 1814. Military defeats against Prussia motivated Austria-Hungary (1868) and France (1873) to (re-)introduce general conscription, while the defeat in the Crimean War had a similar effect for Russia. In Scandinavia, Denmark had introduced universal conscription in the democratic constitution of 1848 as part of a national mobilization against Prussia, and Finland (1870), Sweden (gradually in the 1880s) and Norway (1905) followed in the coming decades. The
United Kingdom only introduced universal conscription during the Great War in 1916.
Mass conscription was an important element in the construction of national citizenship and nation building 16 and may have at least three effects for the welfare state in a broad sense.
Mass conscription and public health
The introduction of mass conscription generated a close nexus between the health status of the (male) population, high infant mortality and military power. Given the poor health status of young men and children caused by the repercussions of industrialization, urbanization and rampant diseases such as tuberculosis, concerns about force levels and combat power increased both among politicians and the military v and triggered, in consequence, social reforms with special emphasis on the social protection of (future) soldiers and mothers. Schmidl 2003, 149n15; Tálos 1981, 24-5 . 21 Cohn 1879, 518n1. 22 Leonhard 2007, 290 . 23 Dwork 1987, 15-21 . 24 Fraser 1973, 137. better Britain in the post-war years. 25 In Switzerland, Joachim Heer, the main architect of the very progressive Swiss Federal Factory Act of 1877, defended the bill by arguing that the ban on child work as well as the prohibition of night and Sunday work for women and children are important vehicles for securing defense capability and military strength. 26 Military concerns about social degeneration also prompted labor protection legislation in the 1880s in Austria-Hungary.
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The share of unserviceable men remained high until the outbreak of World War II. In the U.S., almost 50 per cent of the mustered industrial workers were unfit for military service 28 , while 40
per cent of young men failed the draft physical in Japan in 1935. As a consequence, high-rank military officers and the Japanese Army Ministry proposed the creation of a ministry of health.
In fact, already in 1937 a Welfare Ministry was established and a new national health insurance bill was adopted one year thereafter.
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Mass conscription and education
Secondly, there is evidence that the army literally became a "school of the nation" and that warfare is an important factor behind the emergence of mass schooling. A recent comparative econometric study has found strong evidence that advances in primary education are positively associated with military rivalry or prior war involvement. 30 The military had a keen interest in skill formation and primary education for several reasons. Apart from the fact that information and communication are of particular military importance, technological progress required growing skills for operating and maintaining a more and more sophisticated, dangerous and costly equipment. 31 Reading literacy was a prerequisite for understanding written orders, 25 Gilbert 1970 , 15, 19. 26 Rutishauser 1935 , 112, 123. 27 Ebert 1975 countries also differed in terms of politics as some were autocratic when they entered the war, while others were democratically controlled. For the latter warfare seems to have fostered a national consensus and provided governments with more decision making powers (e.g. emergency measures). However, to which degree this has overdetermined traditional party conflicts over social policy is still an open question. 45 In any case, there are at least five effects for the welfare state understood in a broad sense.
Social policy and mass loyalty
Both World Wars were waged as mass wars. Millions of war victims, an economy of scarcity, higher tax burdens, repression, inflation, famine, longer working time and work duty connected to labor shortages are possible causes of domestic turmoil and social unrest. Since political 44 Hatje 1974. 45 Addison 1994; Jefferys 1991.
stability on the home-front was a prerequisite for succeeding in war, governments of all kinds as well as the military were reliant on achieving mass compliance for the official war aims amongst their populations. In addition to repression and propaganda, strategies aimed at increasing output legitimacy may help to secure mass loyalty and the preparedness for self-sacrifice. Social policy is a classic instrument in this respect. However, the need to become a benevolent warfare state is likely to be constrained by the sheer size of the military budget during wartime. In fact, social spending stagnated or declined in many countries for which data is available 46 , while military spending skyrocketed. While these figures indicate a sharp trade-off between guns and butter in wartime, there is also evidence that governments used social policy to enhance political support.
During the First World War, the autocratic Central Powers were domestically challenged by a growing but disenfranchised labor movement with a considerable organizational power and thus a high strike capability. The so-called political truce policy initiated by German Chancellor
Bethmann Hollweg was an attempt to gain labor's approval for the war and to mitigate classconflict by promising some social compensation. In the beginning, however, national war enthusiasm, which was also shared by the left, eased domestic conflicts. As the war progressed, however, the death toll as well as shortages of food, labor and commodities increased. Against this backdrop, strikes, social unrest and food riots increased in the late war period. While the military often opted to take a hard line, the government was aware of the fact that at least some concessions were necessary, because -in the words of Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg -"we cannot win the war against the working class". 47 The major concession was the recognition of labor representatives as partners in industrial relations in the late war period. Labor shortage in the arms industry led to the Auxiliary Service Bill (Gesetz über den Vaterländischen Hilfsdienst)
in 1916 that obliged men aged from 17 to 60 to work in the arms industry. This militarization of labor, however, was compensated by some welfare benefits and labor representatives were incorporated into arbitration boards and gained influence at the firm level, e.g. through the 46 Flora et al. 1983 . 47 Mai 1997, 98. But even a totalitarian regime such as Nazi Germany was reliant on mass loyalty during wartime.
Not only the charismatic leadership of Adolf Hitler but, as shown by the historian Götz Aly, social benefits also played an important role in this respect: "Continuous bribery in social affairs formed the basis for the internal cohesion in Hitler's Volksstaat". 49 Aly portrays the Nazi regime as a "socio-political dictatorship of complaisance" aimed at improving the living standard and social security of the Volksgemeinschaft. In addition to improved social protection of soldiers and their families 50 , the expropriation of Jews and massive armed robbery in the occupied territories provided resources for redistribution, while labor shortage was resolved by the brutal exploitation of forced laborers.
Not only autocracies in all their nasty variants but also belligerent democracies were in need of political support during wartime. What we can observe there in a situation of a pronounced guns butter trade-off is the promise of a better, more peaceful and socially just post-war order. Lloyd
George's promise of a better Britain after the Great War, which included a public housing program and public health reforms, is a case in point. During the Second World War the war cabinets of Canada, the U.S. and Great Britain, either drafted or announced plans to overhaul social security schemes in the post-war period.
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In January 1941, President Roosevelt enunciated in his annual speech to Congress four freedoms (freedom of speech, want, worship, and fear) for which the war would be fought. This speech not 48 Stolper 1915, 101ff; Tálos 1981, 117-121 . 49 light of the growth of the nation and the expansion of the industrial economy, mere "political rights proved inadequate to assure us equality in the pursuit of happiness" and have therefore to be amended by social rights. He suggested a comprehensive list of social rights, including the right of every family to a decent home; the right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health; the right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness, accident, and unemployment, and the right to a good education".
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Arguably the most famous plan aiming at restructuring social security in the post-war era is the British Beveridge Report issued in November 1942. The report found great attention abroad and fuelled, to some extent, social regime competition between the belligerent nations. Already in April 1943, the Nazi Ministry of Labor published a translation of the Beveridge Report for internal use only. In the document's preface even the Nazis classified the report as a "political offspring" of the Atlantic Charter. However, they jeered that the report "unintentionally provides a comprehensive picture of England's numerous shortcomings in the field of social affairs".
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Motivated by early military success and under the auspices of the head of the German Labor Front, Robert Ley, the Nazis themselves drafted ambitious plans to overhaul the social security system in the post-war period. 55 In an effort to generate mass loyalty, the Nazi propaganda promised the "biggest welfare state in the world" after the end of war. 56 In contrast to the overhaul of the British welfare state envisaged in the Beveridge Report, a postwar Nazi
Sozialstaat luckily never came to fruition.
52 Nullmeier and Kaufmann 2010; Sparrow 2011, 43-5. 53 All quotes from Rosenman 1950, 40-42 . 54 Reichsarbeitsministerium 1943: iii, vi. 55 Smelser 1990 . 56 Reidegeld 1989, 512-3.
Other democracies such as Australia, which to a lesser extent were affected by war, already introduced new and comprehensive social programs in wartime. Among the programs adopted by the Labour government and its conservative predecessor were widows' pensions, unemployment compensation, a funeral benefit and a child endowment scheme. 
The military burden and the rise of the tax state
The need to finance the war was a further step on the road to big government. Military budgets skyrocketed in wartime. In consequence, the tax powers of the central state were everywhere 62 Friberg 1973; Pinder 1981; Schaeffer 1991; Porter 1994; Klausen 1998; Eisner 2000; Sparrow 2011 . 63 Governments also financed the war by borrowing. However, derailing public debt either was translated into hyper-inflation once governments began printing money or debt redemption kept tax levels high in the aftermath of war. As we discuss later, hyperinflation might have a longlasting impact on the public-private mix of the post-war welfare state as it made private fortunes or fully funded forms of social provision worthless and, in consequence, increased demand for public income support.
Social policy diffusion and policy transfer through war
War also affected and restructured existing patterns of social policy diffusion and gave rise to coercive policy transfer. Firstly, this most radically took place through occupation and border revisions. In the aftermath of World War I the map of Europe changed dramatically as new countries emerged and the defeated powers lost territory. This meant that citizens had to be transferred from one social security system to another as it was the case in Denmark when the country reunified with the northern part of Slesvig-Holstein after a referendum in 1920. The process was complicated as the Germans remained financially responsible for war invalids that had served in the German army. 72 During World War II Germany occupied large parts of Europe and this affected the existing social security systems in the occupied territories in several ways. However, the Nazis employed different techniques of occupation. 73 While German legislation was comprehensively imposed on countries such as Austria and Luxembourg, other countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Norway were forced to a close co-operation. In still other countries like Denmark, the domestic political institutions remained basically intact during German occupation. As a result, the effects of German occupation varied across these groups of countries. In the first group, the imposition of German legislation had, in parts, more direct and long-lasting effects. Even though the old national social security legislation was re-established 72 Schultz 2002. 73 Lemkin 1944. after the war, some elements of German social security legislation remained in a revised manner in place. Austria is a case in point as pension insurance for blue-collar workers, which did not exist before the Anschluss, was adopted by Austrian social security legislation. Within the second group, governments tried to pre-empt a more direct Nazi influence by adjusting their welfare systems accordingly. For example, the Quisling government in Norway, with inspiration from Nazi Germany, developed plans for social policy reforms and implemented changes in unemployment insurance and labor market regulation. 74 In the third group, where the local administrations continued to function during German occupation, there was even resistance against a Germanification of social security systems. In Denmark the Ministry of Social Affairs in 1941 launched, in an effort to defend the existing welfare state, a propaganda offensive that included the translation of a more than 400 pages book on the Danish social security system into German 75 and the making of a film on the same topic for a German audience. What all these countries have in common, however, is a drastic deterioration of national social standards in the wake of military occupation 76 . Moreover, there was a brutal exploitation and deportation of the ablebodied labor force with a view to supplying the Nazi war machinery.
Secondly, we find examples of war-related social policy diffusion beyond the German occupied territories. The Beveridge Plan (1942) not only contributed to secure the legitimacy of the British government and its war effort but also immediately became a key reference for social policy debates in other countries offering both practical solutions and a symbolic alternative to the German warfare regime. A special case of policy diffusion is related to the exile governments of occupied countries that were based in London. This gave impetus for new kinds of very direct policy diffusion by establishing a transnational arena for post-war planning. As "one of the most generous and inclusive social entitlements the federal government has ever funded and administered", the program offered social benefits, higher education and vocational training to the 7.8 million veterans of the Second World War. 81 Arguably the most severe problem connected to demobilization was unemployment. While labor shortage and full employment characterized the war period, the return of millions soldiers and the prospective layoffs in the munitions industry at the termination of war were huge challenges for all governments. The fear of social unrest and revolutionary activities of those who risked their lives 78 Gilbert 1970, 19; Fraser 1973, 167 . 79 for the nation motivated many governments to adopt emergency benefits for returning veterans.
With exception of Britain, however, no country had introduced mandatory unemployment insurance before 1914 and even the British scheme was very limited in terms of coverage and the benefits offered. In an effort to contain working-class discontent, the British government introduced, as part of its plans for demobilization, a temporary and non-contributory out-of-work donation for discharged servicemen that was amended and extended by a civilian out-of-work donation. In consequence, unemployment protection became universal and was granted as a social right immediately at the end of war. 82 The British example was not a singular case, however. Several other warring countries such as Austria and Germany extended income support for the unemployed connected to demobilization. Moreover, some of these mechanisms, such as the influx of refugees, were also important for countries not directly involved in combat.
Post-war period
The immediate post-war periods were almost everywhere characterized by comprehensive social policy legislation and led, especially after 1945, to a quantum leap in welfare state development.
This might be related to mass warfare in several ways.
War-induced social needs
In the wake of both world wars over 60 million people lost their lives and total war generated social needs of inconceivable magnitude. The social protection of millions of widows, orphans, disabled veterans, unemployed, refugees and homeless people generated a gigantic challenge for policymakers. All these disastrous outcomes of war created a strong demand for income support provided by government and had a tremendous impact on social expenditure. 82 Gilbert 1970, 54ff.
Political macro-context: The rise of democracy and international social policy co-operation
Mass warfare and the modern mass army seem to have decisively shaped the political and socioeconomic context that facilitated the formation and expansion of the modern welfare state. Both
World Wars ended up in immense destruction, human suffering, economic decline and, in some places, the collapse of regimes and empires. The break-down of multi-national empires after the Great War and racial mania during World War II ended up in an unusually high degree of ethnic homogeneity in European nation states. The impact of ethnic cleansing on the social structure might be related to the welfare state in a particularly perverse manner as some scholars have argued that this kind of societal homogeneity is a precondition for solidarity and redistribution to flourish.
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However, war also meant the breakthrough of democracy. Universal suffrage was a longstanding demand of the labor movement in many countries but it was eventually total war that decided this struggle. Given the blood toll of millions soldiers, mainly recruited from the lower strata of society, and the large-scale mobilization of the female labor force in wartime it was no longer possible for governments to deny political participation after the end of war: "Mass military service and mass carnage had created a democratic imperative". 84 In fact, both World
Wars meant a quantum leap in terms of the extension of male suffrage and/or the introduction of women's suffrage. 85 Moreover, the Great War was a catalyst for the introduction of proportional representation x , with important implications for government spending and redistribution. 86 As a result, all the tremendous war-induced social needs were politically addressed to democratic governments after both wars, at least in the group of countries which later became the founding members of the OECD. Political competition, the participation of lower income groups and the 83 Alesina and Glaeser 2004. 84 Porter 1994, 172-73 . 85 Porter 1994; Kasza 1996, 359; Przeworski 2009; Hicks 2013 . 86 Iversen and Soskice 2006.
involvement of unions in politics, and the changes in individual and collective preferences discussed in the next subsection translated the war-driven sudden shift in public intervention in social and economic affairs into a stable, long-term trajectory of continuous welfare state expansion.
Moreover, both world wars also were catalysts for the intergovernmental co-operation in social and economic policy. Carnage, destruction and social turmoil created both a necessity and a window of opportunity for establishing international collaboration in social and economic af- 
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Given a wide-spread traumatization and manifold loss experiences, it is extremely plausible that war contributed to a realignment of individual preferences toward stability, security and collective insurance 91 . Moreover, wars generally increase risks and make subjective risk calculation difficult 92 . In this situation, individuals typically show a greater propensity to seek insurance 93 , including those who would otherwise consider themselves as good risks. These changes in individual preferences may also have affected collective behavior in at least four respects. First, the aforementioned changes of individual preferences increase the chance that policies favoring risksharing and risk prevention are adopted at the collective level. The most important institutional device of risk-pooling is the welfare state. Second, lesson drawing is important and had a similar policy impact. "Learning from catastrophes" 94 has paved the way for policies and institutions designed to prevent a recurrence of similar traumatic events in the future. Third, the hardships of war encountered by large segments of the population strengthened solidarity and egalitarianism. 89 Fraser 1973, 193 . 90 Biess and Moeller 2010. 91 Dryzek and Goodin 1986. 92 Overbye 1995, 327. 93 Dryzek and Goodin 1986, 30 . 94 Schmidt 1989.
Titmuss has summarized the British experience as follows: "The mood of the people changed and, in sympathetic response, values changed as well. If dangers were to be shared then resources should also be shared". 95 This realignment of values encouraged a qualitative change in social provision as the odium of traditional poor relief was replaced by the notion that welfare benefits should be delivered as a matter of social rights. 96 Moreover, people became accustomed to big government that had emerged during wartime and affected the everyday life of people.
Even in the U.S., habituation to the state was a hallmark of World War II. War II on the Swiss welfare state has been much weaker compared to countries being at war.
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The legacy of war policies as welfare state catalyst
Arguably the most well-known feedback effect of war on post-war public policy is the 'displacement effect' detected by Peacock and Wiseman 99 in their study on British public expenditure development. They argued that large scale disturbances such as major wars would 95 alter the people's ideas about tolerable levels of taxation and shift public revenues and expenditure to higher levels during wartime. However, war-induced higher tax rates and expenditure would never return to their pre-war levels due to habituation effects, institutional rigidities and new war-related spending obligations. Peacock and Wiseman also claimed that war contributes to a 'concentration process' of public spending in decentralized or federal polities.
The reason is that local authorities are incapable to cope with the repercussions of large-scale emergencies so that a pooling of resources is indicated. Once an armistice has been reached, the discontinuation of the military burden as well as the enhanced institutional and fiscal capabilities of the state could be used for civilian spending purposes. Post-war democratic governments could also quickly respond to the social needs created by war as they could rely on measures, preparatory work and proposals that had been drafted or were already implemented during war. In fact, many (but not all) of the measures and short-term expedients that were enacted by use of emergency powers were transferred into ordinary legislation after the war. In addition, 'war socialism' had endowed governments with plenty of experience in how to manage the economy and post-war governments benefited from the massive increase in administrative capacities, policy jurisdictions and fiscal powers that emerged during wartime. 100 Empirical evidence for the accelerating effect of wartime policies on post-war social policy is abundant. In Germany, the Great War was with no doubt a pacemaker for the 
Effect on timing of program adoption
War is important to understand cross-national differences in the temporal adoption of welfare programs. There is evidence that the immediate post-war period has been a phase of rapid social policy legislation and that war and war preparation are be closely associated with the introduction of particular welfare state programs: Unemployment compensation, housing and income support to families are key areas where the state has intervened for the first time on a larger scale. Legislation in these fields is strongly motivated by population policy, the demobilization of millions of soldiers and the dismissal of millions of workers related to the break-down of the arms industry after the war. The immediate post-war period was also an era of intensive legislative activity in terms of labor law, employment protection, and working time (e.g. eight hours day). In addition, categorical benefit schemes for disabled veterans and other victims of war were established. Finally, war has triggered legislation and reforms in educational affairs and housing. Britain, with the passage of the Fisher Education Act (1918), the Butler Act (1944), the National Health Service and Housing Act (1946) and the Housing Act (1949), is a case in point.
Effect on the public-private mix
War has significantly shaped the public-private mix as it paved the way toward more public welfare provision in those countries suffering from massive destruction and/or from hyperinflation.
Dryzek and Goodin have argued that "under conditions of uncertainty, actuaries will be unable to assess risks with any confidence, and hence prudent brokers will refuse to supply insurance. The state alone is capable of filling this gap". 109 In addition, war upsets financial markets and therefore constrains the ability of private insurance to deliver. In fact, in most countries of continental Europe, total war has strongly crowded-out markets for social provision and discredited fully funded modes of welfare financing in the aftermath of war. By contrast the evidence is more mixed for those nations which were not struck by acts of war on their own homeland and/or by hyperinflation. The private and occupational welfare was not negatively affected but even strengthened in countries such as the United States and Switzerland. However, war is only a necessary but is not sufficient condition in this respect. Much depends on the power resources of pro-welfare state parties. Japan and, more recently, South Korea are countries where war had a massive impact, but which, under conditions of a marginalized political left, nevertheless strongly relied on private forms of social provision after the war. On the other hand, the strong left in the Scandinavian countries crowded out markets from social provision even though the war im- 
Effect on social spending
Total war had a tremendous impact on public social spending. In Germany, for example, warrelated social spending amounted, on average, to 17.1 per cent of total expenditure between 1927 and 1960. 114 Germany is of course an extreme case in this respect but even in less affected countries war related social expenditure played a role. War is therefore an important variable for understanding post-war spending trajectories and cross-national differences in social expenditure.
Particularly the Second World War may help to explain why -and, in contrast to the expectation of functionalist accounts of the 1960s -there was no catch-up of the then welfare state laggards in social spending after 1945. An important reason for lacking convergence is that war significantly pushed spending levels up exactly in countries which suffered from a high number of casualties and severe destructions on their homeland territory during both world wars and which already had maintained high pre-war spending levels due to the early introduction of social programs (e.g. Germany, Belgium, Austria, France, Italy). Most welfare states laggards (from today's perspective), by contrast, were not strongly affected by war, at least on their national territory. In these countries, additional social spending caused by war was mainly related to categorical programs tailored to the needs of veterans and their families. A third group consists of the welfare state pioneers in Scandinavia and New Zealand where the war effects were limited and mainly seem to have affected the timing of program adoption.
Growing welfare state convergence since the 1980s
While the Golden Age of the welfare state in the 1950s and 1960s was characterized by growing dissimilarities in social policy, recent empirical studies are indicative of a growing convergence 114 Zöllner 1963. of social spending and regulatory standards since the 1980s. 115 One reason for this outcome is that the impacts of war petered out with the passage of time. Two processes are important in this respect and both are related to demographics. First, the victims of war passed away over time and thus relieved governments from previous war-related spending commitments. Second, generational replacement could be related to a shift in policy preferences. 116 Beginning in the mid 1980s, the policymakers of the Golden Age period, i.e. the political elites who had personally witnessed total war and/or the Great Depression, stepped down from office and were gradually replaced from office by elites born in the post-war period and who therefore grew up in an era of unprecedented economic affluence and political stability. The traumatic experiences of the cohorts born prior to the Second World War lingered in the memories for decades. This experience is important for understanding the rise of the post-war interventionist state and the underlying Keynesian compromise, whereas the markedly different socialisation of the post-war cohorts might be one factor that has reinforced the retreat of the interventionist (welfare) state since the 1990s.
Conclusion
This paper has systematically brought together theories and findings regarding how mass warfare has affected the development of western welfare states and developed a possible unified framework for analyzing the relationship between war and the welfare state more systematically. Table 1 and 2 provide a tentative assessment of the relevance of the discussed causal mechanisms and the related effects in different settings. Needless to say, this is not the end of the road but rather the beginning. We need to engage in systematic comparative studies what also includes data collection. Such comparisons should involve two elements. One is to focus on particular aspects of the war-welfare state nexus through rigorously empirical testing the individual mechanisms and possible effects discussed in this paper. The other element is to provide comprehensive case studies that follow a similar analytical framework allowing for a comparison of how war has affected welfare state development in different national contexts and over time. All in all, this calls for larger collective and crossdisciplinary research projects which rely on a multi-method approach and close international collaboration.
Bringing the warfare-welfare nexus into comparative welfare state research allows us to address classic research topics in new ways and to reconsider the grand narratives of welfare state research in terms of agency (e.g. role of the military), the functions and legitimacy of the state (through the provision of encompassing security) and the interdependencies between countries.
One intriguing question, for example, would be to examine how war has (not) contributed to the variety of Western welfare states as captured by the classic welfare state typologies. A further promising avenue of research would be to extend the scope of analysis with respect to country coverage, the type of war, and the time period studied.
